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THE TRIAL OF CHARLES I: A 
SESQUITRICENTENNIAL REFLECTION 
Louis J. Sirico, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 20, 1787, deputies to the Constitutional Con-
vention debated whether the national executive should be 
"removeable on impeachment and conviction for malprac-
tice or neglect of duty." 1 Some, like Gouverneur Morris of 
Pennsylvania, argued against impeachment: "Besides, who 
is to impeach? Is the impeachment to suspend his function. 
[sic] If it is not the mischief will go on. If it is the im-
peachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and 
will render the Executive dependent on those who are to 
impeach."2 
Benjamin Franklin argued that impeachment benefited 
the executive: "History furnishes one example only of a 
first Magistrate being formally brought to public Justice. 
Every body cried out [against] this as unconstitutional. "3 
Franklin pointed out that the alternative had a drawback: 
"What was the practice before this in cases where the chief 
Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse 
was had to assassination in [which] he was not only de-
prived of his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his 
character."4 Impeachment thus would benefit both the citi-
zen and the executive: "It [would] be the best way there-
* Professor, Villanova University, School of Law. 
1. See James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, re-
printed in Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 64 (Yale 
U. Press, 1911) ("Notes"). The deputies to the Convention had yet to settle on the final 
language or even on the title of "President." The Constitution makes the chief executive 
impeachable for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." U.S. 
Const., Art. II,§ 4. The Framers did not discuss lesser penalties such as censure. 
2. Notes at 64-65 (cited in note 1 ). 
3. I d. at 65. 
4. Id. 
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fore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punish-
ment of the Executive when his misconduct should deserve 
it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be un-
justly accused."5 
In referring to "the only first Magistrate brought to 
public justice," Franklin alluded to Charles I of England, 
the second Stuart king, who, in 1649, was tried and sen-
tenced to beheading.6 Franklin could not have supported 
his argument with a more inappropriate illustration. 
Charles confronted a High Court of Justice that the House 
of Commons had created to issue a predetermined verdict. 
When the King appeared before the High Court, he could 
not present his defense. By Franklin's time, English legal 
authorities had long since agreed that Charles was the vic-
tim of murder.7 
The hindsight of three hundred fifty years inevitably 
leads us to reflect on the subsequent reign of Oliver 
Cromwell, the Restoration of Charles II, and the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, which ended the Stuart line and estab-
lished parliamentary supremacy. However, a narrower fo-
cus on Charles's trial and beheading is sufficient to teach us 
lessons on two subjects: first, how lawlessness seeks to im-
personate the rule of law, and, second, as Gouverneur 
Morris recognized, how excessive power in one branch of 
government can destabilize a political system and even de-
stroy it. 
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A friend once described Charles as a very bad king, but 
a very good martyr.8 Like his father, James I, he believed 
5. ld. 
6. Because England had yet to adopt the Gregorian calendar, the English would 
have dated Charles's execution January 30, 1648. Under the Gregorian calendar, which 
enjoyed wide use in Europe, the date was February 9, 1649. Today, the English date the 
event as January 30, 1649. See C.V. Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles 264 (Mac-
millan Co., 1964) (published in Great Britain with minor revisions and different pagina-
tion as The Trial of Charles I (Penguin Books, 1983)). Despite the unfortunate title, 
Dame Veronica Wedgwood's book offers the best detailed narrative on Charles's latter 
days. 
7. See F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 282 (Cambridge U. 
Press, 1908). 
8. The brief history that I recount is uncontroversial. Recent historical narratives 
include Charles Carlton, Charles I: The Personal Monarch (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1983); Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (Yale U. Press, 1992); and Michael 
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in the divine right of kings. This position aggravated his 
continuing conflicts with parliaments increasingly domi-
nated by the Puritans. After four disastrous parliaments, 
Charles ruled for eleven years without calling another. 
During this interim, he managed to heighten his unpopu-
larity. Not only did he support Archbishop Laud in im-
posing high church uniformity on religious observances, he 
also raised revenues by exacting duties and dues without 
calling Parliament. 
The cost of Charles's war against Scotland finally 
forced him to summon Parliament. The House of Com-
mons was uncooperative, and Charles quickly dissolved it. 
The increasing financial demands of the war soon com-
pelled him to call another Parliament and make numerous 
concessions concerning his prerogatives and methods of 
governance. Nonetheless, conflict continued and reached a 
climax when Charles sent armed men into the House of 
Commons to arrest the five members most hostile to him. 
By 1642, Charles and Parliament had begun a civil war, 
which ended in Charles's defeat. Numerous attempts to 
reach a negotiated settlement failed. The army now con-
trolled Parliament and successfully insisted on trying the 
King for treason. As planned, Charles was convicted. On 
the scaffold, he delivered a stirring speech declaring that 
his loyalty to the rule of law made him the martyr of the 
people. This oft-quoted excerpt sums up his position and 
demonstrates his appeal to his supporters: 
For the people-and truly I desire their liberty and freedom 
as much as anybody whomsoever-but I must tell you that 
their liberty and their freedom consists in having of govern-
ment those laws by which their life and their goods may be 
most their own. It is not for having share in government, sirs; 
B. Young, Charles I (St. Martin's Press, 1997). A recent documentary history of Charles's 
last days is David Iagomarsino and Charles J. Wood, eds., The Trial of Charles I: A 
Documentary History (U. Press of New England, 1989). For a review of modem scholar-
ship on Charles's reign, see Young, Charles I at 1-13. 
Some historians blame Charles's character defects for his failure as king. See, e.g., 
Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I at 954; Young, Charles I at 180. Others blame the 
English Civil War on socio-economic transformations in English society that resulted in a 
class war. See, e.g., Christopher Hill, The English Revolution: I640 at 11, 65-67 (Law-
rence & Wishart, 3d ed. 1985). Still others blame it on an institutional breakdown of ad-
ministration by both the Crown and Parliament. See, e.g., Conrad Russell, Parliaments 
and English Politics: I62I-I629 at 423 (Clarendon Press, 1979). Others place the blame 
on factional and irresponsible parliaments. See, e.g., J.P. Kenyon, Stuart England 44-46, 
84-85,97, 107 (Allen Lane, 1978). 
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that is nothing pertaining to them. A subject and a sovereign 
are clean different things. And therefore until they do that- I 
mean, that you do put the people in that liberty as I say-cer-
tainly they will never enjoy themselves. Sirs, it was for this 
that now I am come here. If I would have given way to an ar-
bitrary way for to have all laws changed according to the 
power of the sword, I needed not to have come here. And 
therefore I tell you-and I pray God it be not laid to your 
charge-that I am the martyr of the people.9 
Charles's death marked the beginning of the eleven-
year Interregnum in which Oliver Cromwell ruled as Lord 
Protector. After Cromwell's death, England turned to 
Charles's son and acknowledged him as Charles II. The 
exhumed heads of Cromwell, his son-in law, and the High 
Court's President were placed on public display atop 
Westminster Hall. The anniversary of Charles's execution 
became a date of commemoration on the liturgical calen-
dar of the Anglican Church.10 
Ill. LAW AND LAWLESSNESS 
For the period surrounding the trial, the most powerful 
theme is the exaltation of form over substance: The army 
and its Puritan allies believed they could not execute 
Charles without appearing to follow acceptable legal pro-
cedure. 
The very idea of trying a king must have appalled 
English citizens. The concerns that Gouverneur Morris 
raised in 1787 about impeaching an American executive 
also plagued them-and with a far greater intensity. They 
9. Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 142 (cited in note 8). 
10. Charles was the only post-Reformation figure that the Book of Common Prayer 
recognized as a saint. It is not surprising that John Keble, a founder of the Anglo-
Catholic Oxford Movement, would agree that Charles was a martyr who sacrificed his 
life rather than compromise the faith and order of the Anglican Church. See Geoffrey 
Rowell, The Vision Glorious: Themes and Personalities of the Catholic Revival in Angli-
canism 22 (Oxford U. Press, 1983). In 1831 he commemorated Charles's death by 
preaching that "it must ever seem quite as natural, that the Church of England should 
keep this day, as it is that Christ's universal Church should keep the day of St. Stephen's 
martyrdom." !d. (quoting John Keble, Sermons, Academic and Occasional (J.H. Parker, 
1847)). 
Queen Victoria, who did not care for Charles, removed the commemoration day 
from the Calendar of the Book of Common Prayer. See O.C. Edwards, Jr., Anglican 
Pastoral Tradition, in Stephen Sykes and John Booty, eds., The Study of Anglicanism 343 
(Fortress Press, 1988). Her action prompted the founding of the Society of King Charles 
the Martyr, which promotes the commemoration of the date of his death. 
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were contemplating impeaching not just the constitutional 
head of govemment,11 but also a hereditarr monarch, who, 
some believed, could heal with his touch.1 The Cromwel-
lians tried to overcome objections by disposing of the King 
through the formal legal process of a trial. 
In putting Charles on trial, the Cromwellians knew 
that, at the least, they were exploring the outer limits of the 
established legal system. Thus, a great many of those ap-
pointed to the High Court were unwilling to serve.13 Even 
before the trial, the Cromwellians were uncertain what 
course to take if Charles challenged the High Court's juris-
diction over him, as he did.14 
The importance of the appearance of legality is, in it-
self, remarkable. At the time of these events, the House of 
Commons contained no Royalists, and the Presbyterian 
members declined to go along with the Cromwellians in 
bringing Charles to trial. The army responded by purging 
the Presbyterians from Parliament and imprisoning forty-
one of them. Now Commons could legally pass the ordi-
nance ordering the trial. 15 
When the House of Lords refused to consent to a trial, 
Commons decided that it could act unilaterally. It unani-
mously declared that as representative of the people, it had 
11. Britain, of course, has an unwritten constitution, that is, an accepted political 
order, which like other constitutions, changes over time. As Kermit Hall has written, "the 
British constitution was a collection of documents- Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and 
the Act of Supremacy, for example-as well as customary practices that had historically 
limited the government's exercise of arbitrary power." Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mir· 
ror: Law in American History 51 (Oxford U. Press, 1989). As Russell Kirk has intimated, 
a successful written constitution and an unwritten one enjoy more similarities than dif· 
ferences: 
Constitutions are something more than lines written upon parchment. When a 
written constitution endures, and most of them don't endure very long, that 
document has been derived successfully from long established customs, beliefs, 
statutes, and interests, and has reflected a political order already accepted, tac-
itly at least, by the dominant element among the people. Constitutions, in short, 
are not invented; they grow .... A constitution without deep roots is no true 
constitution at all, and it will not endure. 
Russell A. Kirk, The Conservative Tradition, in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., The Political 
Theory of the Constitution 40 (U. Press of America, 1990). 
12. See Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles at 10,68 (cited in note 6). 
13. See Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 42 (cited in note 8) (the 
High Court issued warrants summoning absent court commissioners); Wedgwood, A 
Coffin for King Charles at 104-13 (cited in note 6) (noting poor attendance and the defec-
tion of several prominent individuals). 
14. See Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles at 105, 139, 150-51 (cited in note 6). 
15. See Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 14-15 (cited in note 8); 
Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles at 38-43 (cited in note 6). 
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the supreme power and could make law without the con-
sent or concurrence of the King or House of Lords.'6 Try-
ing Charles required that Commons create and staff a spe-
cial High Court. Initially, the highest ranking judicial 
figures in England were to preside over the High Court: the 
Lord Chief Justice of England, the Lord Chief Justice of 
the Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron of the Ex-
chequer.17 When they declined, the position went to John 
Bradshaw, an undistinguished jurist sitting in Chester and 
Wales.'8 When the Attorney General pleaded illness, the 
job of prosecution fell to John Cook, an obscure lawyer.'9 
The High Court's key positions were thus staffed by rela-
tively unknown lawyers, but lawyers nonetheless. 
The High Court even tried to create an aura of legiti-
macy by the way it designed its trappings. A committee of 
the Court took care in selecting gowns for the court offi-
cers, determining the ceremonial protocol, and arranging 
for a mace and a sword to precede the Lord President into 
court.20 On the clerks's table lay a copy of the charge and 
the mace and sword crossing one another. 21 
What make the story more than the tale of a kangaroo 
court are the sincerity of the regicides and the personality 
of the King. Charles played to the ultimate jury of history 
and emerged victorious. The King challenged the High 
Court's jurisdiction and refused to plead. The High Court 
could not cope with this anticipated claim other than to in-
sist repeatedly that it had jurisdiction and that Charles 
should answer the substantive charge. On three occasions, 
16. See Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 22-23 (cited in note 8). 
17. ld. at 36. 
18. See id. at 37. For a portrait and thumbnail biography, see id. at 36. 
19. For a portrait and thumbnail biography, see id. at 88. 
20. See id. at 43. Here is a description of the beginning of the first day of trial 
(January 20, 1649): 
On Saturday ... the Lord President of the High Court of Justice with near four 
score of the members of the said court, having sixteen gentlemen with partizans 
and a Sword and a Mace with their and other officers of the said court marching 
before them, came to the place ordered to be prepared for their sitting at the 
west end of the Great Hall at Westminster, where the Lord President in a crim-
son velvet chair fixed in the midst of the court placed himself, having a desk 
with a crimson velvet cushion before him, the rest of the members placing 
themselves on each side of him upon the several seats or benches prepared and 
hung with scarlet for that purpose, and the partizans dividing themselves on 
each side of the court before them. 
ld. at 58-60. 
21. See id. at 60. For an engraving showing the High Court in session, see id. at 59. 
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Bradshaw responded by ordering the King's removal from 
the courtroom.22 Charles's dignity and restrained elo-
quence contrasted favorably with the excessively zealous 
p~osecution and the Court's refusal to let him speak his 
ptece. 
Charles tied his jurisdictional defense to a far larger 
theme: protecting the people's liberties. He stood for law 
against lawlessness, even lawlessness dressed in the garb of 
legitimacy. Charles thus showed that when lawless conduct 
seeks acceptance by mimicking lawful conduct, it fails to 
reach its goal. 
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY 
According to Charles's argument, a rump Parliament 
created a court to try a king and thus wrongfully claimed 
the power to alter the kingdom's constitutional structure of 
government. Such illegitimate institutions and lawless 
conduct, Charles maintained, threatened all English citi-
zens.23 The King thus laid the groundwork for his claim, 
later widely accepted, that he was the martyr of the people. 
Seven years earlier, Charles had also challenged a re-
allocation of power as threatening the stability of the Eng-
lish Constitution. In 1642, the King issued "His Majesty's 
Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of 
Parliament," a polemic declaring that England had a mixed 
government consisting of three estates: the King, the Lords, 
and the Commons.24 He argued the importance of keeping 
a balance among them. According to his argument, Com-
mons was upsetting the equipoise by demanding too much 
power. 
According to Charles's argument, England was gov-
erned by a shared sovereignty of the King, Lords, and 
Commons, as opposed to a condescending monarchy.25 
22. See Wedgwood, A Coffin for King Charles at 168 (cited in note 6). 
23. See, e.g., Iagomarsino and Wood, The Trial of Charles I at 86, 112, 142 (cited in 
note 8). 
24. See Douglas W. Kmiec and Stephen B. Presser, The American Constitutional 
Order 51-53 (Anderson Publishing, 1998); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: 
Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 361-66 (Princeton U. 
Press, 1975). 
25. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment at 361 (cited in note 24); Gordon S. 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 at 199, 347 (U. of North Caro-
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Given the King's political ideology, he could not have be-
lieved the argument.26 Nonetheless, the notion of mixed 
government quickly became the paradigm for the political 
system.27 American revolutionaries would later argue that 
the British government had upset the balance in mixed 
government by encroaching on the colonial assemblies and 
interfering with the internal affairs of the colonies.28 
During the American Constitutional Convention, the 
delegates faced the question of how to maintain a balance 
of power between the departments of government and still 
create a stable government. Their problem differed from 
that of seventeenth century English constitutionalists, 
whose notion of mixed government was of a unified polity 
of monarchy, aristocracy, and the people, that is, govern-
ment by "Crown-in-Parliament."29 American thinkers had 
dispensed with the idea of a unified government and 
adopted Montesquieu's notion of separation of powers, 
which allocated separate functions to the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial departments of government.30 Despite the 
difference, the American deliberations were reminiscent of 
the controversies of 1649. In both the English and Ameri-
can situations, the deliberators had to determine the power 
relationships within the polity and the functions of the po-
litical powers. For example, in defining the function of the 
executive, Gouverneur Morris seemed to echo Charles in 
asserting that the executive should be the "guardian of the 
people" against legislative tyranny.3' In contrast, Roger 
lina Press, 1969). 
26. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment at 361-66 (cited in note 24). 
27. See id. 
28. See Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 200-02 (cited in note 25). 
29. See, e.g., Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Sec/arum: The Intellectual Origins of 
the Constitution 80-83 (U. Press of Kansas, 1985); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: 
Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 245-SO (Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). 
30. See Rakove, Original Meanings at 248-SO (cited in note 29). The idea of a sepa-
ration and balance of equal tripartite political entities harks back at least to the Roman 
stoic Polybius. See Susan Ford Wiltshire, Greece, Rome, and the Bill of Rights 127 (U. of 
Oklahoma Press, 1992). 
31. One great object of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The Leg-
islature will continually seek to aggrandize [and] perpetuate themselves; and 
will seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion or convulsion for 
that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive ~agistrat~ sh?uld be the 
guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, [agamst]_Leg~sl~uve tyran~y, 
against the Great & the wealthy who m the course of thmgs will necessanly 
compose-the Legislative body. 
Notes at 52 (cited in note 1). The notion is also reminiscent of Viscount Bolinbroke's 
idea of a patriot king who rises above politics to champion the public good. See Rakove, 
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Sherman of Connecticut stated that he "considered the Ex-
ecutive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for 
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect."32 
Underlying three issues faced by the Constitution's 
drafters was the intractable question of how to guarantee 
the executive's independence from the legislative branch 
while still placing checks on the executive. The issues were 
how to select the executive, whether and how to impeach 
and convict the executive, and whether and how the execu-
tive could veto acts of the legislative branch. In each case, 
the debates were extensive, and in at least two cases, the 
difficulty of the issue resulted in an awkward compromise: 
the electoral college with close contests referred to Con-
gress and a cumbersome impeachment process involving 
impeachment by the House and a trial by the Senate. Both 
issues continue to be subjects of modern public debate. 
The continuing controversy demonstrates the great diffi-
culty in allocating authority within a political system. 
Separation of powers and checks and balances are not al-
ways harmonious doctrines. 
The Cromwellians also faced the question of how to 
check the executive, but in a more challenging setting. 
While America's Framers were engaged in creating a new 
political order, the Cromwellians had to stand an existing 
one on its head. They sincerely believed that removing the 
King from office was essential to the nation's survival and 
that executing him was essential to prevent him from re-
claiming the throne. The method they chose had to be 
credible to English citizens and to themselves. The laws of 
England, however, offered no mechanism for removing and 
executing a king. Therefore, they had to create such a 
mechanism. 
A credible mechanism would have to parallel mecha-
nisms that the culture already accepted. It also would have 
to enjoy the sanction of either a traditional political 
authority or a new one with some claim to legitimacy. The 
Cromwellians therefore had Parliament manufacture a trial 
court. The Parliament, however, was a rump, and the trial 
Original Meanings at 247-48 (cited in note 29). 
32. Notes at 65 (cited in note 1). Of course, the notion of the Executive developed 
over the course of the Constitutional Convention. For a brief summary of the competing 
VISIOns and the Convention's resolution, see Fred Barbash, The Founding: A Dramatic 
Account of the Writing of the Constitution 175-83 (Linden Press, 1987). 
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was rigged. By seeking consistency with the existing politi-
cal order and paradoxically claiming its illegitimacy, the 
Cromwellians placed themselves in an impossible predica-
ment. Removing the king necessarily altered the political 
system by allocating extensive authority to Parliament, and 
an illegitimate Parliament at that. The inevitable conse-
quence was a disastrous interregnum.33 
V. CONCLUSION 
In his only recorded speech at the Virginia convention 
to ratify the Constitution, Zechariah Johnson referred to 
Charles's execution and its aftermath.34 Though Johnson 
had no difficulty with the decision to execute Charles, he 
was deeply troubled by the ensuing events: 
For the want of an efficient and judicious system of republi-
can government, confusion and anarchy took place. Men be-
came so lawless, so destitute of principle, and so utterly un-
governable, that, to avoid greater calamities, they were driven 
to the expedient of sending for the son of that monarch whom 
they had beheaded, that he might become their master.35 
He feared that unless America followed up on its 
revolution with a constitution, liberty would also be in dan-
ger: "This is like our situation in some degree. It will com-
pletely resemble it, should we lose our liberty as they did. 
It warns and cautions us to shun their fate, by avoiding the 
causes which produced it."36 
To avoid such confusion and anarchy, Johnson argued 
for the safeguard of the proposed constitution. His histori-
cal analogy may have overstated the point; the United 
States enjoyed the stability of state governments and the 
imperfect Articles of Confederation. However, Johnson 
discerned the dangers that arise from disrupting the politi-
cal order as the Cromwellians had done. No matter how 
strenuously they tried, they could not disguise the radical 
nature of that conduct. 
33. See Rakove, Original Meanings at 246 (cited in note 29). 
34. See Jonathan Elliot, ed., 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 648-49 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1866). 
35. Id. at 649. 
36. ld. 
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I leave open the question whether we can distinguish 
between Charles's execution and such other upheavals as 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution 
of 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789. As Edmund 
Burke, the prominent Whig statesman observed: "The 
speculative line of demarcation, where obedience ought to 
end and resistance must begin, is faint, obscure, and not 
easily definable."37 Whatever one's assessment of Charles, 
Burke's line of demarcation was plainly crossed in the way 
the king was tried and executed. 
Three hundred fifty years later, we continue to see 
events reminiscent of Charles's trial. Both corrupt gov-
ernments and terrorists mimic the forms of legal proceed-
ings without regard to the purpose of the rule of law. 
When an accepted governmental structure of a society be-
comes inconvenient, they reconstruct or destroy it. 
Charles's trial suggests two lessons and a moral. The first 
lesson: People can amend and manipulate law to justify even the 
most radical conduct. The second lesson: The rule of law is so 
ingrained, at least in Anglo-American culture, that it compels us 
to conduct ourselves so that our actions arguably conform to it. 
37. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 3 The Writings and 
Speeches of Edmund Burke 270-71 (Little, Brown and Co., 1901) ("Burke's Speeches"). 
Burke continued: 
It is not a single act or a single event which determines it. Governments must be 
abused and deranged indeed, before it can be thought of; and the prospect of 
the future must be as bad as the experience of the past. When things are in that 
lamentable condition, the nature of the disease is to indicate the remedy to 
those whom Nature has qualified to administer in extremities this critical, am-
biguous, bitter potion to a distempered state .... (A) revolution will be the very 
last resource of the thinking and the good. 
ld. at 271. Burke favored the Glorious Revolution: "The Revolution was made to pre-
serve our ancient, indisputable laws and liberties and that ancient constitution of govern-
ment which is our only security for law and liberty." Id. (emphasis in original). Here, he 
reflected general British sentiment. See Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: 
The Convention of 1787 and the First Congress 28 & n.18 (Pennsylvania State U. Press, 
1993). Burke also sympathized with American discontent as evidenced by his Speech on 
Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies (1775) in 2 Burke's Speeches at 
99 and his Letter to John Farrand John Harris, Esqrs., the Sheriffs of the City of Bristol 
(1777), in id. at 187. After the American Revolution began, Burke urged a peaceful set-
tlement. See Carl B. Cone, 1 Burke and the Nature of Politics: The Age of the American 
Revolution 302-03 (U. of Kentucky Press, 1957). Perhaps his most famous work is his de-
nunciation of the French Revolution, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), in 3 
Burke's Speeches 231. Burke was distressed by the actions of the Cromwellians and exe-
cution of Charles. See Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Gilbert Elliott (Sept. 22, 1793), 
in P.J. Marshall and John A. Woods, eds., 7 The Correspondence of Edmund Burke 431-
32 (Cambridge U. Press, 1%8). For an excellent summary of Burkean political philoso-
phy, see Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 619,642-59 (1994). 
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The moral: When we manipulate the law to suit our needs, truth 
and class nevertheless sometimes win out, at least in the long 
run. 
